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Hey Employer, Did You “Notice” My Text Message?  
INTRODUCTION 
Missy works as a waitress at a popular local restaurant. Missy has been 
diagnosed with gout, a medical condition characterized by recurrent 
attacks of inflammatory arthritis. Attacks are spontaneous, but when an 
attack occurs, it causes an excruciating pain in her foot, rendering her 
unable to perform her job as a waitress. Missy was scheduled to work on 
Saturday afternoon—the restaurant’s busiest night. However, a few hours 
before her shift started, Missy began experiencing symptoms of her 
condition––her feet were so swollen that she was unable to walk. From 
past experience, Missy knew she needed to properly request leave. Under 
the employee handbook, the restaurant required her to call the Human 
Resources Director as soon as possible. Missy had a good relationship with 
her direct supervisor and usually reported ordinary absences to the 
supervisor. At the start of her shift on Saturday, Missy sent her direct 
supervisor a text message conveying that her foot was swollen and she 
could not come into work. The General Manager of the restaurant 
terminated Missy before the start of her next shift for noncompliance with 
the employee handbook, stating that Missy failed to give timely notice and 
provide notice in the correct form. Missy brought a retaliation claim 
against her employer, alleging that she was actually terminated for taking 
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave and further that her employer’s 
justification of noncompliance was a pretext for discrimination.1 
Disputes can and often do arise when employees contact employers 
using nontraditional forms of communication or informal conversations in 
an attempt to provide “notice” of unforeseeable leave under the FMLA.2 
The FMLA allows covered employees to take time off from work for 
medical reasons and prohibits employers from taking adverse action 
against the employee for taking such leave.3 Since the 2009 revisions to 
the FMLA notice provisions, courts have continued to issue inconsistent 
rulings on what constitutes sufficient notice in cases of unforeseeable 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by MELISSA J. SHAFFER. 
 1. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012) 
[hereinafter FMLA or the Act]. 
 2. Elijah Yip, Text Me, Maybe? Maybe Not!, HAW. EMP. L. LETTER, Aug, 
2013, at 3. 
 3. See Kenza Bemis Nelson, Employer Difficulty in FMLA Implementation: 
A Look at Eighth Circuit Interpretation of “Serious Health Condition” and 
Employee Notice Requirements, 30 J. CORP. L. 609, 611–12 (2005). 
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leave as well as when termination for noncompliance is justified.4 The 
unclear jurisprudence is especially troublesome in light of modern forms 
of communication, such as text messaging, permeating the professional 
realm and being used for employee–employer communication.5 The 
divided jurisprudence is attributable to, among other things, the 
ambiguous language of the FMLA notice provisions and the courts’ failure 
to interpret those provisions in accordance with the Act’s purpose.6 
The inconsistencies regarding the employer’s authority to terminate 
employees who fail to adhere to call-in procedures and the employee’s 
ability to disregard policies under certain justifications jeopardize the 
employer’s ability to conduct normal business operations.7 Conversely, 
the inconsistencies regarding the employee’s ability to disregard policies 
under certain justifications disadvantage employees who find themselves 
without a job during times of medical emergencies.8 Given the stated 
purpose of the FMLA—to ensure security for both the employer and the 
employee9—the current notice provisions for unforeseeable leave under 
the Code of Federal Regulations10 must be amended to replace the rigid 
rule of compliance with a two-stage notice procedure. A two-stage notice 
procedure will guide courts in determining whether the employees should 
recover under their retaliation claims despite noncompliance with 
employer policies. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the FMLA and 
corresponding federal regulations, focusing on the purpose of the 2009 
revisions and the policy concerns underlying the FMLA. Part II examines 
the ambiguous language of the FMLA notice provisions and the 
conflicting jurisprudence in cases of unforeseeable leave, examining each 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Adequacy of Notice to Employer of Need 
for Leave Under Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 184 A.L.R. 171 
(2003). 
 5. Id. (“A friend who managed a local restaurant once complained to me 
about the questionable work habits of his young employees. ‘They don’t call in to 
say they’ll be late to a shift. They text me!’ My friend can now say that a court 
shares his sentiment, at least when it comes to exercising rights under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).”). 
 6. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 613. 
 7. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,552 (proposed June 
28, 2007) (codified at 79 C.F.R. 825 (2016)). 
 8. Id. at 35,557. 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
 10. Id. § 2654 (“The Secretary of Labor shall prescribe such regulations as 
are necessary to carry out subchapter I of this chapter and this subchapter not later 
than 120 days after February 5, 1993.”); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.300–825.313. 
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element of notice—timing, content, and form. Part III analyzes the 
implications of the current state of the law on employers and employees. 
Part IV argues that Congress should amend the Code of Federal 
Regulations to include a two-step notice process in cases of unforeseeable 
leave to clarify the law and provide employers and employees with more 
consistency and security.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FMLA 
The National Partnership for Women and Families drafted the FMLA, 
which was signed into law on February 5, 1993.11 The FMLA was the first 
and only national law aimed at helping working men and women balance 
the conflicting demands of work and family.12 The law allows eligible 
employees13 of covered employers14 to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid, 
                                                                                                             
 11. Celebrating 20 Years of Job-Protected Leave—and Working to Help Even 
More Families, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.national 
partnership.org/issues/work-family/fmla.html [https://perma.cc/4B5T-D7XU] (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2016). See also About Us, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES http://www.nationalpartnership.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/Z2A8-
LQ95] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (“The National Partnership for Women & 
Families is a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)3 organization located in Washington, 
D.C. [F]or four decades, [they] have fought for every major policy advance that has 
helped women and families.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (defining “eligible employee” as “an employee who 
has been employed—(i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to 
whom leave is requested under section 2616 of this title; and (ii) for at least 1,250 
hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period”; 
eligible employee “does not include—(i) any Federal officer or employee covered 
under subchapter V of chapter 63 of Title 5; or (ii) any employee of an employer 
who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 
employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 
miles of that worksite is less than 50”). 
 14. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (defining “employer” as “any person who is engaged 
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 
or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar 
workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year; (ii) includes—(I) any person 
who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the 
employees of such employer; and (II) any successor of interest of an employer; 
(iii) includes any ‘public agency’, as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and 
(iv) includes the Government Accountability Office and the Library of Congress. 
(B) Public Agency, for purposes of subparagraph (A)(iii), a public agency shall 
be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity 
affecting commerce.”). 
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job-protected15 leave per year for medical reasons such as the birth or 
adoption of a child, care of a spouse, child, or parent with a “serious health 
condition,” or the employee’s own “serious health condition” that makes 
the employee “unable to perform the functions of the employee’s job.”16 
Congress enacted the FMLA to prevent employment discrimination 
against employees with serious health conditions, to allow pregnancy leave 
for women, and to allow men and women to participate in early child-rearing 
stages without compromising job security.17 Specifically, in section 2601 of 
the Act, Congress stated that there is inadequate job security for employees 
who have “serious health conditions that prevent them from working for 
temporary periods.”18 This section also states that the primary responsibility 
of caring for family falls on women more than men and interferes with 
women’s work to the extent that it encourages employers to discriminate 
against them in employment decisions.19 Based upon these findings, 
Congress enacted the FMLA to promote the stability and economic security 
of families in a way that also accommodates the legitimate interests of 
employers.20  
A. Employees Must Give “Notice” of the Need for Leave 
Although the FMLA provides employees with job security during 
medically related leave, this protection is conditional. The Act requires 
employees to take such leave in a manner that “accommodates the legitimate 
interest of employers.”21 This requires, among other things, that employees 
give employers notice of the need to take leave.22 In determining whether 
an employee’s notice for unforeseeable leave was sufficient under the 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. § 2614(a)(1). Job protection stems from the employee’s right: “(A) to 
be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee 
when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position with 
the equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.” Id. 
 16. Id. § 2612. 
 17. Id. § 2601. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 2601(b)(1)–(5). 
 21. Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3)). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1). 
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FMLA, three components are independently evaluated: the timing of the 
notice,23 the content of the notice,24 and the form of the notice.25 
The federal government revised these provisions in 2009 after 
conducting two studies and receiving over 15,000 public comments in 
response to a “Request for Information” published in the Federal Register 
in December 2006.26 Despite responses that the FMLA was “generally 
working well,” the employees often wanted a greater leave entitlement, 
while employers voiced concerns that unscheduled, intermittent leave for 
chronic health conditions compromised their ability to manage business 
operations and control attendance.27 The prevalence of employees with 
chronic health conditions taking unscheduled, intermittent FMLA leave 
was an unanticipated effect of the Act,28 and it is the most severe area of 
friction between employers and employees seeking to use FMLA leave.29 
Employers complained of scheduling problems caused by employee 
absences with little or no notice, particularly where employers perceived 
employee abuse in taking such leave.30 Employers also expressed concerns 
for loss of management control and the negative impact on employee 
morale and productivity.31 Employees emphasized the significance of 
intermittent leave in cases of incurable diseases with sporadic episodes and 
the importance of job security.32 In response to these concerns, the 
Department of Labor (the “Department”) revised the FMLA regulations in 
hopes of striking a better balance between the statutory requirements and 
the congressional intent.33 The 2009 revisions to employee notice 
                                                                                                             
 23. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (2016). 
 24. Id. § 825.303(b). 
 25. Id. § 825.303(c). 
 26. Revised Final Regulations Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, WAGE 
& HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/finalrule.htm [https://perma 
.cc/7VBA-KPE2] (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
 27. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,551 (proposed June 
28, 2007) (codified at 79 C.F.R. § 824 (2016)). 
 28. Id. at 35,552. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 35,557 (“A railroad employee of thirty-six years said he uses 
intermittent leave to care for his wife, who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis 
(“MS”). Acknowledging the sporadic need for leave, the commenter said, ‘Since 
MS is an incurable disease without a schedule or any way of knowing when an 
episode is going to [occur], I cannot always foresee when I am needed at home.’”). 
 33. Id. at 35,552. 
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requirements for unforeseeable leave imposed several major changes to 
the timing, content, and form of notice that are still in effect today. 
1. Timing 
First, in responding to employer complaints that employees’ abuses of 
leave left employers with little or no notice, the revisions eliminated the 
“one to two business days” time frame set forth in the 1995 regulations.34 
The Department noted that the two-day rule had been misinterpreted to 
allow employees an additional two business days after they were aware 
they needed leave to notify the employer, regardless of whether it would 
have been practicable for the employee to notify the employer sooner.35 
Consistent with the original act, the current provision states that when the 
need for leave is unforeseeable, the employee must give notice “as soon 
as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”36 
However, the revisions added that “[i]t generally should be practicable for 
the employee to provide notice . . . within the time prescribed by the 
employer’s usual and customary notice requirements applicable to such 
leave.”37  
2. Content 
While the revisions to the requirements of timing attempted to 
alleviate employers’ complaints of abuse, the Department also sought to 
clarify the regulation’s standard for sufficient content of notice. Before the 
revisions, employers and employees found it difficult to meet their 
responsibilities under the FMLA because neither party knew what 
information was sufficient to notify an employer that FMLA leave was 
needed.38 The 1995 regulations stated that an employee “need not 
expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA” when 
                                                                                                             
 34. Before 2009, the timing requirements for an employee’s notice for leave 
that was not foreseeable provided an employee “to give notice to the employer of 
the need for FMLA leave as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case,” noting that it is “expected that an employee will give notice 
to the employer within no more than one or two working days of learning of the 
need for leave, except in extraordinary circumstances where such notice is not 
feasible.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (1995). 
 35. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 35,576. 
 36. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (2016). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 35,584. 
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providing notice.39 Rather, depending on whether the employee mentions 
FMLA in his or her notice, the burden might shift to the employer to 
inquire more about the circumstances surrounding leave and whether such 
leave potentially falls under the FMLA.40  
The Department attempted to address this ambiguity in the revisions 
by clarifying the exact information needed and to what degree of 
precision.41 The provisions state that “[a]n employee shall provide 
sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether 
the FMLA may apply to the leave request.”42 Articulating the degree of 
precision the employee must use in requesting potential FMLA-qualifying 
leave, the regulations provide that such information could include that an 
employee is “unable to perform the functions of the job”43 because of a 
medical condition, “that the employee is pregnant or has been hospitalized 
overnight,”44 or that the employee or a family member is “under the 
continuing care of a health provider.”45  
Additionally, the revisions distinguished between employees who are 
seeking FMLA-qualified leave for the first time and employees who have 
previously taken leave for an FMLA-qualified reason.46 For employees 
seeking leave for the first time, the employee “need not expressly assert 
rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA,” but “merely calling 
in sick” will not be enough to trigger the employer’s obligation under the 
Act.47 However, when an employee seeks leave for a previously qualified 
reason, the employee “must specifically reference either the qualifying 
reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave.”48 If these requirements are 
met, the burden then shifts to the employer to obtain any additional 
information through informal means.49  
                                                                                                             
 39. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) (1995).  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. §§ 825.303(a)–(c), 825.300(b)(1) (“When an employee requests 
FMLA leave, or when the employer acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave 
may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer must notify the employee 
of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business days, absent 
unusual circumstances.”). 
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3. Form 
In addition to timing and content, employers were also concerned with 
form—the last element of notice—because the FMLA was unclear as to 
how it affected the employers’ abilities to enforce their internal notice 
policies.50 The provisions require an employee to “comply with the 
employer’s usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for 
requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances.”51 Under the regulations, 
an employer’s policy may require the employee to contact a specific 
individual or call a designated number.52 Moreover, the regulations 
provide examples for when unusual circumstances might exist, which 
justify an employee’s noncompliance with the employer’s policy.53 In the 
context of unforeseeable leave, unusual circumstances would exist if the 
employee required emergency medical treatment and could not use a 
phone or did not have access to a phone.54 Currently, the form provisions 
allow an employee’s spokesperson to give notice if the employee is unable 
to do so personally.55 Absent unusual circumstances, the employer may 
delay or deny FMLA leave when an employee fails to comply with the 
employer’s usual notice and procedural requirements.56 
B. Remedies Available to Employees for Wrongful Denial of Leave or 
Adverse Action 
The FMLA provides employees with two different causes of action 
when an employer wrongfully denies leave or discriminates against the 
employee for taking federally protected leave.57 Section 2612 of the Act 
grants covered employees substantive rights to take protected leave58 and 
requires employers to have internal leave policies.59 Additionally, section 
2615 bars employers from penalizing employees and other individuals for 
                                                                                                             
 50. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,571 (proposed June 
28, 2007) (codified at 79 C.F.R. § 825 (2016)). 
 51. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. § 825.304. 
 57. Norton v. LTCH, 620 F. App’x 408, 409 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 58. 29 U.S.C. §2615 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 2612(a)(1). 
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exercising their rights under the Act.60 These provisions create two types 
of claims available to employees when employers violate section 2612 or 
2615.61 The first is an “interference claim,” in which an employee asserts 
that his or her employer denied or otherwise interfered with his or her 
substantive rights under the FMLA.62 The second is a “retaliation claim,” 
in which an employee asserts that his employer retaliated against him 
because he engaged in activity protected by the FMLA.63  
The employee carries the burden of proof for each cause of action. To 
make a prima facie showing of interference, employees must show the 
following: first, that they were entitled to FMLA leave; second, that some 
adverse action by the employer interfered with their right to take FMLA 
leave; and third, that the employer’s action was related to the exercise or 
attempted exercise of the employees’ FMLA rights.64 To prevail in a 
retaliation claim under the FMLA, plaintiffs must prove the following: 
first, that they invoked their right to FMLA-qualifying leave; second, that 
they suffered an adverse employment decision; and third, that the adverse 
action was causally related to their invocation of rights.65  
In cases of unforeseeable leave, employees frequently bring retaliation 
claims against their employer66 rather than interference claims because 
these cases involve employees who did in fact take the leave, but were 
terminated during the leave or upon returning to work.67 Because 
retaliation claims require an employer to have acted with a discriminatory 
intent, employers often argue that the termination was not retaliation for 
the employee taking FMLA leave.68 Rather, the employers argue that 
termination was a result of the employee providing insufficient notice of 
                                                                                                             
 60. Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1217 (D. 
Kan. 2006). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301–02 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
 66. Although employees often try to bring both interference and retaliation 
claims, thus blending the two together, courts consistently separate them and find 
that retaliation claims are more appropriate under the facts that generally arise in 
terminations following unforeseeable leave requests. See Campbell, 447 F. Supp. 
2d at 1220 (“In this circumstance, plaintiff’s claims are more properly analyzed 
as a single retaliation claim–not as separate interference and retaliation claims.”). 
 67. See Campbell, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 
 68. See, e.g., Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 
2015). 
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the need for leave.69 The post-2009 provisions specifically provide that an 
employer can “take appropriate action under its internal rules and 
procedures for failure to follow its usual and customary notification rules, 
absent unusual circumstances, as long as the actions are taken in a manner 
that does not discriminate against employees taking FMLA leave.”70 
Employers argue that they had no knowledge of the employee’s FMLA 
leave because the employee reported it to the wrong person or left a 
message on the answering machine instead of speaking with the employer 
directly, and therefore the employee was terminated for failing to comply 
with the employer’s internal notice procedures.71 
Retaliation claims are important because these claims implicate the 
notice provisions of the FMLA and the employers’ call-in policies.72 In 
these cases, courts consider whether the employee provided sufficient 
notice under the FMLA and under the employer’s internal procedures.73 
Because the federal circuits have not issued bright-line rules for what 
constitutes “sufficient notice” or “unusual circumstances,” both 
employees and employers are left uncertain as to when FMLA leave is 
justified.74 
II. COURTS STRUGGLE TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR UNFORESEEABLE LEAVE 
In cases of foreseeable leave, sufficiency of notice is a much less 
troublesome issue because an employee can give his or her initial notice 
in advance, which gives the employer additional time to decide if the leave 
is FMLA-qualified and the employee time to correct any deficiencies.75 
Under the unforeseeable leave scenarios, determining what constitutes 
sufficient timing, content, and form of an employee’s notice is much more 
difficult because the provisions governing unforeseeable leave are 
ambiguous and fail to make necessary distinctions between emergency 
and non-emergency situations.76  
Notice is timely if it is given “as soon as practicable under the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case,” but the law provides no clear 
guidance on when the giving of notice becomes “practicable” and the 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. 29 C.F.R. § 825.304(e) (2016). 
 71. See, e.g., Hudson, 787 F.3d at 866. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 613. 
 75. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302. 
 76. Id. § 825.303(a). 
2017] COMMENT 923 
 
 
 
regulations do not distinguish between emergency and non-emergency 
situations.77 The employee must give enough information to put the employer 
on notice that he or she is taking leave that may qualify as FMLA leave; 
however, depending on the circumstances, what constitutes sufficient 
information in one case may not be sufficient in another.78 Last, the employee 
must provide notice in the form proscribed by the employer’s “usual and 
customary . . . procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual 
circumstances,” but there is no definitive criteria to determine if an unusual 
circumstance exists that would justify noncompliance.79 The federal circuits 
differ in their conclusions of whether an employee’s notice was sufficient in 
time, content, and form despite the factual similarities between cases.80 This 
is problematic because employers and employees are uncertain whether an 
employee’s notice is timely, provides enough information, and was given in 
the proper form to invoke the protection of the Act.81  
A. Sufficient Timing Under the FMLA  
For unforeseeable leave, the regulations state that an employee must 
give notice “as soon as practicable.”82 Moreover, the regulations note that 
it generally should be practicable to comply with the employer’s timing 
requirements applicable to such leave.83 However, this requirement is 
circular because most employer policies mimic the language provided in 
the regulations by saying an employee should give notice “as soon as 
possible” in cases of unforeseeable leave.84  
Notice “as soon as practicable” will differ depending on the facts of 
each case because unforeseeable leave encompasses a wide variety of 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. § 825.304(b). 
 79. Id. § 825.304(c). 
 80. Compare Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d 
Cir. 2012), with Lanier v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 527 F. App’x. 312 (5th 
Cir. 2013); see supra Part II.B. 
 81. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,584 (proposed June 
28, 2007) (codified at 79 C.F.R. § 825). 
 82. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“Metro-North’s internal leave policy provides, in relevant part, ‘[i]f the need for 
FMLA leave is not foreseeable, employees must give notice to their supervisor as 
soon as possible.’”); see also Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 
608, 612 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If the leave was not foreseeable, the policy required ‘as 
much notice as possible.’”). 
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circumstances.85 For example, an employee who has been diagnosed with 
recurring migraines could likely still give the employer notice of the need 
for leave despite having a migraine, whereas it may not be practicable to 
require an employee who has been rushed to the emergency room for a 
seizure to call the employer before the start of the shift. Litigation continues 
to center around the issue of whether notice was given “as soon as 
practicable.”86 
In Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, a discharged 
employee brought a retaliation claim against her former employer alleging 
that she was terminated in violation of the FMLA when she took leave to care 
for her seriously ill mother.87 To justify her termination, the employer cited 
chronic tardiness and absenteeism in violation of its internal policies, as well 
as failure to give advance notice of leave.88 The employee’s scheduled shift 
was to begin at 3:00 p.m.89 Early that morning her mother was rushed to the 
hospital after collapsing from unexpected and excruciating leg pain.90 The 
employee called her supervisor before noon to say she could not make her 
shift.91 The district court granted summary judgment in the employer’s 
favor and the employee appealed.92 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit found that the failure to follow employer policies was “belied 
by the unforeseeable nature of the emergency” and the employer’s 
previous admissions that she had followed proper procedure by calling her 
supervisor soon after arriving at the emergency room.93 Therefore, the 
court found in favor of the employee and held that the facts presented were 
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute about whether the employee 
notified the employer as soon as practicable.94 The court in Lichtenstein 
emphasized that a reasonable jury could have found that notice was given 
“as soon as [was] practicable.”95  
In contrast, the court in Norton v. LTCH was not willing to excuse an 
employee’s failure to notify her employer, despite the unforeseeable 
                                                                                                             
 85. 29 C.F.R. §825.303(a). 
 86. See Ashley Hawley, Taking a Step Forward or Backward? The 2009 
Revisions to the FMLA Regulations, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 137, 153 (2010). 
 87. Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 88. Id. at 309. 
 89. Id. at 298. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 296. 
 93. Id. at 304 n.15. 
 94. Id. at 304. 
 95. Id. 
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nature of the emergency.96 Kathleen Norton was terminated for a late 
arrival to her shift following excessive absenteeism, and she brought 
interference and retaliation claims against her former employer.97 Norton 
worked at McLaren Bay Specialty Care (“MBSC”) as a registered nurse 
for approximately 17 years.98 MBSC approved Norton’s intermittent 
FMLA leave due to vestibular migraines a month before her termination.99 
MBSC’s policy required employees who needed to take intermittent leave 
to “call the Family Leave Call Center at least two hours before their 
scheduled shift[].”100 After Norton was informed that she was eligible for 
intermittent leave, she arrived two minutes late for her shift and failed to 
give advance notice as the policy required.101 Norton claimed the two-
minute delay was “unavoidable,” stating that she suffered symptoms 
unexpectedly while driving to work and had to pull her car over for safety, 
which caused her delay.102 The court found this argument unconvincing 
because not only did she fail to give advance notice, but Norton never 
discussed her tardiness with anyone before her termination, which 
occurred four days after she arrived late to her shift.103 The court granted 
MBSC’s motion for summary judgment on both claims because Norton 
knew she needed to alert MBSC every time her qualified condition 
prevented her from working a shift or arriving on time and she failed to do 
so.104  
Not only did Norton fail to provide timely notice, but the court also 
found that Norton failed to fulfill the FMLA requirements for the content 
of notice.105 Because Norton had been previously qualified for intermittent 
FMLA leave, she had a duty to specifically alert MBSC each time her 
leave was related to the vestibular migraines.106 Although the timing of an 
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 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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employee’s notice is a separate consideration from the content of an 
employee’s notice, the two are closely related in cases of unforeseeable 
leave.107 If leave is unforeseeable because of a medical emergency, such as 
in Lichtenstein, the timing and content requirements of notice have a greater 
degree of flexibility.108 However, where the unforeseeable leave is for a 
previously FMLA-qualified reason, such as in Norton, employees are held 
to a higher standard for the notice to be timely and sufficient in content 
because they are already familiar with their obligations under the FMLA 
and can likely fulfill them.109 
B. Sufficient Content Under the FMLA  
Another significant implication of the revisions is that employees must 
precisely state certain information when requesting FMLA leave, and the 
standard is different for employees requesting leave for the first time and 
employees who have previously taken FMLA leave.110 For employees 
seeking leave for the first time, merely “calling in ‘sick’” is not enough, 
but the employee does not need to “expressly assert rights under the 
FMLA or even mention the FMLA.”111 Such information could include 
that the employee is “unable to perform the functions of the job” because 
of a medical condition, that the employee’s family member is “under the 
continuing care of a health care provider,” or that the employee is pregnant 
or has been hospitalized overnight.112 For employees who have previously 
taken FMLA leave, they must specifically reference the previously 
qualified condition or the need for FMLA leave.113 However, the revisions 
provided little clarity to the sufficiency of information requirement, which 
is the most contested issue addressed by the federal courts.114  
In Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,115 the 
employee conveyed the following facts to her employer when calling in: 
“(1) she was ‘currently in the emergency room,’ (2) her ‘mother had been 
brought into the hospital via ambulance,’ and (3) she ‘would be unable to 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Hawley, supra note 86, at 150. 
 108. Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 304 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
 109. Norton, 620 F. App’x. at 411. 
 110. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) (2016). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. §§ 825.302(c), 825.303(b). 
 113. Id. § 825.303(b). 
 114. See Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012); 
see also Lanier v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 527 F. App’x. 312 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 115. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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work that day.’”116 The district court concluded that the employee did not 
give enough information to her supervisor to place the employer on notice 
of FMLA leave.117 In its reasoning, the court stated the fact that a family 
member has been taken to the emergency room does not necessarily mean 
the situation is serious enough to warrant coverage under the FMLA.118 
The court noted that although an emergency room visit may be serious, it 
may not require ongoing treatment.119  
The Third Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the district court’s 
analysis was incorrect.120 The question is not whether the given information 
eliminates non-FMLA situations, but “whether the information allows an 
employer to ‘reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply.’”121 A 
dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s reasoning dictates that the 
employer must assume the FMLA may apply any time an employee calls in 
saying he or she needs to go to the hospital.122 The majority denied that their 
holding facilitated this result because Lichtenstein gave more than a generic 
reference to a hospital.123 Instead, she specifically told her employer that her 
mother had been “taken to the emergency room in an ambulance.”124 The 
majority reasoned that being rushed to the hospital in an ambulance is more 
severe, and more likely to be covered by the FMLA, than employees who 
check themselves into the emergency room.125 Thus, the majority 
concluded that this case is not one in which a vague reference to a hospital 
makes a serious health condition “merely conceivable but not sufficiently 
likely to warrant shifting the burden of inquiry onto the employer.”126 
Although the Third Circuit held the provided information was sufficient 
to invoke the employee’s right to FMLA leave, its decision is sharply 
contrasted with a nearly identical Fifth Circuit case, Lanier v. University 
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center.127 
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In Lanier, the Fifth Circuit rejected a discharged employee’s 
interference and retaliation claims, holding that the employee’s text 
message to her supervisor, stating that her father was in the emergency 
room and that she was not able to make her on-call shift, was insufficient 
to place the supervisor on notice that the employee was requesting medical 
leave to care for her father.128 The plaintiff argued that her employer had 
the duty to further inquire because her supervisor knew her father was over 
90 years of age, in poor health, and having breathing problems.129 The 
court found that it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to know 
that the employee meant to request FMLA leave based on these facts.130 
Although the ultimate issue in Lanier was the content of the notice and not 
the form in which it was provided, the fact that the employee gave notice 
via text message likely contributed to the deficiency in information.131 
Text messaging and other similar forms of communication generally 
encourage abbreviated and informal communications.132 Ultimately, the 
form in which the notice was provided can have an effect on the amount 
of content the employee provides.133 
C. Sufficient Form Under the FMLA and the Internal Procedures of 
Employers 
The last requirement for determining the sufficiency of notice is whether 
the form of the notice was appropriate, which is examined in reference to the 
employer’s internal call-in policy.134 The current unforeseeable leave 
provisions now provide that the employee’s form of notice “must comply with 
the employer’s usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for 
requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances.”135 The regulations also 
explicitly state that such policies may require employees “to call a designated 
number or a specific individual to request leave.”136 The regulations provide 
that the employer can take action under its internal rules and procedures for 
employee noncompliance, absent unusual circumstances, as long as the 
actions do not discriminate against employees taking FMLA leave.137 
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Since the revisions, the enforcement of the employer’s internal policies in 
retaliation cases has developed in two factual circumstances: first, where 
the employee gives notice in the wrong form and the employer lacks actual 
knowledge of the notice;138 and second, where the employee gives notice 
in the wrong form, but the employer has actual knowledge of the notice.139 
The court must then decide if the employer’s termination was justified or 
taken in a discriminatory manner.140  
However, even if the court finds that the employer’s termination was 
legitimate, the employee may still be excused for noncompliance if there 
are unusual circumstances.141 Even in cases with almost identical fact 
patterns, courts reach different results in deciding whether terminations 
are discriminatory and if there are unusual circumstances that excuse 
employees’ noncompliance with employer policies.142  
1. Wrong Form of Notice and Employer Lacks Actual Knowledge 
of Notice 
When an employee fails to give notice in accordance with the 
requirements of the employer’s internal leave policy and is later terminated, 
whether the employer had actual knowledge of the notice is a significant 
consideration in retaliation and interference claims. Cavin v. Honda of 
America Manufacturing, Inc. was decided before the 2009 revisions to the 
notice requirements and is a case in which the Sixth Circuit reversed and 
remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
employer on FMLA interference and retaliation claims.143 Honda’s leave 
policy required any employee requesting FMLA leave to contact its Leave 
Coordination Department, but for ordinary, non-FMLA absences, 
employees contacted security.144 After injuring himself in a motorcycle 
accident, Cavin, a Honda employee, called security to request a leave of 
absence, indicating that the leave was potentially FMLA leave.145 Honda 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2003); see 
also Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013).  
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argued Cavin’s notice was insufficient because the notice that Cavin gave 
to security was never relayed to management.146 
The Sixth Circuit recognized that “[t]he goals of the FMLA are more 
likely to be met when a large company coordinates FMLA leave through 
one department that is familiar with the FMLA and its accompanying rules 
and regulations.”147 However, it ultimately concluded that if notice to 
security is sufficient for non-FMLA call-ins, then it should also be 
sufficient for FMLA notice, and that emergency-type situations should be 
afforded more leniency.148 The court stated the knowledge of Cavin’s 
supervisor should be imputed to Honda’s management.149 Moreover, the 
court noted that Honda could have protected itself against inadequate 
notice by requiring communication between its security and Leave 
Coordination Departments to ensure that the management would have 
actual notice of an employee’s leave request.150 This ruling was overturned 
by the 2009 revisions because the unforeseeable leave regulations now 
explicitly provide that “an employer may require employees to call a 
designated number or a specific individual to request leave.”151 Following 
the revisions, Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Manufacturing was decided, and 
in that case the Sixth Circuit recognized that Cavin’s holding could no 
longer be enforced.152 
In Srouder, an employee brought an interference claim after he was 
terminated for numerous violations of the employer’s attendance policy.153 
The policy required employees to call a specified “call-in line” for 
reporting absences.154 The employee failed to call the specified line to 
report his absence and instead had a brief discussion with his supervisor 
about the need to have surgery.155 The employee claimed that he provided 
his employer with adequate notice through the conversation with his 
supervisor and that he thought the supervisors directly received the 
messages from the call-in lines.156 The court looked to the express 
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language of the statute to hold that his employer did not interfere with the 
employee’s FMLA rights and that the termination was justified.157  
Because the employer satisfied the burden of proving a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination, the court then 
turned to any possible “unusual circumstances” that may have justified the 
employee’s noncompliance.158 However, the court found that no such 
circumstances existed.159 In a footnote to the opinion, the court explained 
that the employee’s hernia did not render him incapable of complying with 
his employer’s policies because he was able to go to his doctor’s office 
with FMLA paperwork and then drop off that paperwork before his 
surgery that afternoon.160 Thus, there was no reason to conclude the 
employee was unable to make any phone calls.161  
Although unforeseeable leave is generally afforded more flexibility in 
the sufficiency of notice that is required, the Department has recognized 
the importance of employers receiving actual notice of an employee’s 
request for leave and being able to properly manage FMLA leave 
requests.162 However, when employers do receive actual notice of an 
employee’s leave, albeit not in the manner required by the employer’s 
policy, courts have difficulty finding this shortcoming to be an adequate 
justification for termination.163 
2. Wrong Form of Notice and Employer Has Actual Knowledge 
In sharp contrast to Srouder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Millea v. Metro-North Railroad Co. held that an employer’s 
leave policy could not require an employee to provide notice directly to 
the supervisor when such a policy would impose stricter requirements than 
what is required by the FMLA.164 Millea, an ex-Marine who suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and his supervisor became involved in a 
heated disagreement while at work, triggering a panic attack for Millea.165 
Millea immediately left work to see his doctor.166 Metro-North’s leave 
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policy provided, “[i]f the need for FMLA leave is not foreseeable, 
employees must give notice to their supervisor as soon as possible.”167 
Because the encounter with his supervisor triggered the attack, Millea did 
not inform his supervisor that he was leaving work to go to the doctor, but 
instead asked the lead clerk to inform the supervisor, which the clerk 
did.168  
Metro-North argued that Millea’s termination was justified as a matter 
of law by Millea’s failure to comply with Metro-North’s internal leave 
policy requiring an employee to “notify his supervisor directly when 
FMLA leave is taken.”169 The company argued that the district court erred 
when it instructed the jury that an employer cannot provide more stringent 
notification rules than what the FMLA requires.170 Metro-North argued 
that the “not more stringent” language applies only when the employer’s 
timing requirement of notice is more stringent, but not when the form is 
more stringent.171 The Second Circuit disagreed, stating that the FMLA 
limits stringency in terms of timing and form of notification172 and that the 
FMLA allows an employee to provide notice through a spokesperson if 
the employee is unable to provide notice himself.173 Thus, the court held 
the employee’s termination was not justified because the supervisor had 
actual knowledge and the regulations allow a “spokesperson” to provide 
notice if the employee is unable to do so himself.174 
In Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., the Eighth Circuit also held that 
the termination of an employee was unjustified when the employer 
received actual notice despite noncompliance with the employer’s 
policies.175 The court reversed and remanded a district court’s grant of the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Hudson presented 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact that he adequately 
notified Tyson and was actually terminated based on his use of FMLA 
leave.176 Hudson, a manager at Tyson, was terminated after he failed to 
show up for work due to an illness.177 Tyson’s attendance policy, which 
Hudson signed, stated, “[a]ll management Team Members are expected to 
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personally call their direct supervisor to report an unplanned absence or 
report that they will be late.”178 In violation of this policy, Hudson asked 
his girlfriend and co-worker to report that he was sick and would be out a 
few days.179  
Additionally, Hudson claimed that he sent his supervisor a text 
message before the start of his shift that he was having health issues, 
needed to see a doctor, and would be out for a few days.180 Hudson alleged 
that he frequently texted with his supervisor and that he had previously 
notified his supervisor via text of an absence despite Tyson’s policy 
requirements that he call his direct supervisor.181 Hudson’s supervisor 
contradicted this by testifying that employees were “supposed to call in, 
just like anybody else. They’re supposed to get ahold of somebody” or 
“notify HR.”182 The court looked to the precise language contained in 
Tyson’s policy, noting that the policy did not require calling a specific 
person.183 From these facts, the court concluded that a trier of fact could 
infer that terminating Hudson for failing to call his supervisor, when other 
methods of notification are acceptable, is a pretext for discrimination.184  
The court emphasized the fact that the employer had actual notice. In 
its analysis, the court pointed to the fact that the employer’s own notes 
stated that “Hudson had notified the company (although not by phone).”185 
Thus, the court concluded that Hudson presented sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of fact that he adequately notified Tyson and was 
actually terminated based on his use of FMLA leave.186  
Courts’ inconsistency in the interpretation and application of the 
notice requirements for unforeseeable leave has undermined the primary 
objective of the FMLA.187 The Act was intended to benefit both employers 
and employees.188 However, the benefit has become more of a burden as 
inconsistent jurisprudence leaves employers and employees uncertain of 
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their obligations under the Act, rendering employers vulnerable to lawsuits 
and employees vulnerable to termination.189  
III. THE CURRENT NOTICE PROVISIONS FOR UNFORESEEABLE 
LEAVE CAUSE UNFORESEEABLE RESULTS  
The Department report summarizes the problems the 2009 revisions 
to the FMLA intended to address.190 In an attempt to meet employer needs, 
the notice requirements in the regulations were aimed at giving the 
employer sufficient notice to make staffing accommodations, to correctly 
classify leave as FMLA protected, and to clarify employers’ obligations 
under the Act.191 In recognizing employee needs, the Department noted 
that it is not always practicable to require employees to give advance 
notice, to provide overly detailed notice, or to comply with the obligations 
of their employer’s internal policies.192 To meet the needs of both the 
employer and the employee, the regulations generally require compliance 
with the employer’s internal policies, but this compliance is subject to a 
case-by-case analysis.193 Moreover, the regulations recognize exceptions 
to the rule of compliance, and these exceptions are couched in ambiguous 
wording to provide more flexibility in their interpretation.194 However, the 
same debate remains just as prevalent, if not more, six years after the 
revisions’ enactment.195 Employers continue to complain of untimely 
notice, ambiguous requirements, and policy abuse.196 Additionally, 
employees continue to face uncertainty in job security when an 
unforeseeable emergency arises and fear that their notice was not 
sufficient to withstand termination.197  
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A. The Timing Requirements are Not “Practicable” 
The current FMLA regulations require an employee to give notice of 
the need for unforeseeable FMLA leave as soon as practicable, which 
should generally comply with the employer’s policies applicable to such 
leave.198 The vague language and case-by-case analysis, as opposed to 
having a definite time period, leads to situations in which employees may 
be tempted to use their certification of FMLA leave to justify tardiness, 
ignore mandatory shift call-in procedures, and fail to allow enough time 
for the employer to make staffing adjustments.199  
Both Lichtenstein and Norton illustrate the difficulties courts face in 
trying to apply the timing requirements under the current regulations.200 In 
Lichtenstein, the Third Circuit found the employer’s argument that 
Lichtenstein failed to give advance notice of her leave unconvincing 
because of the unforeseeable nature of the emergency.201 The court also 
emphasized Lichtenstein’s emotional state after seeing her mother in the 
hospital, noting that she had never seen her mother cry as she did that day 
and that she called her employer despite being “unnerved.”202 
However, Lichtenstein was aware that her mother was being taken to 
the hospital early that morning and notified her employer around noon, 
only after her arrival at the hospital and just three hours before her shift 
was to begin.203 The court could have just as easily determined that the 
notice was not given as soon as practicable, and that Lichtenstein should 
have notified her employer when she first became aware that she would not 
make her 3:00 p.m. shift, which she likely realized before noon. Advance 
notice was especially important since Lichtenstein was working in  health 
care, a field that the Department has recognized as being especially harmed 
by little or no advance notice because employee specialization makes 
finding replacements difficult to coordinate.204  
Similar to Lichtenstein, Norton also illustrates how the deficiency in the 
regulation’s timing requirements can lead to seemingly arbitrary decisions. 
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In Norton, the employee, Norton, alleged that she could not give advance 
notice of her late arrival to work because she experienced symptoms of her 
condition while she was driving to work, and she did not anticipate being 
late.205 Assuming Norton did unexpectedly experience symptoms of her 
condition while she was driving to work, such as vomiting, which required 
her to pull over and caused her tardiness, then it would seem impracticable 
to require advance notice.206 However, it seems unlikely that employees 
who have been previously qualified for FMLA leave because of a 
recurring medical condition will frequently experience an attack of their 
condition at the exact moment or just immediately before the time their 
shift is to begin.207 To an employer, this scenario looks like a classic case of 
an employee’s abuse of previously qualified leave, where the employee is 
using her condition to justify tardiness and failure to comply with the 
employer’s policies.208 
Furthermore, the timing requirements do not differentiate between 
unforeseeable leave for emergency-type situations and leave for previously 
qualified conditions, and thus encompass everything from recurring migraines 
to a heart attack.209 The regulations attempted to balance the needs of 
employers and employees in all situations by generally requiring compliance 
with the employer’s policies.210 Although the timing requirements do not 
differentiate between unforeseeable leave for emergency-type situations and 
unforeseeable leave for previously qualified conditions, the requirements 
governing the content of an employee’s notice do make this distinction.211 It 
is illogical to make the distinction between an emergency situation and 
intermittent leave in regard to content of notice, but not in regard to the timing 
of notice, especially because these two requirements are often intertwined. 
Lastly, the timing provisions fail to articulate a bright-line rule to 
determine when noncompliance is justified.212 Without any bright-line 
rules to determine if timing was sufficient, the fact finder is given 
enormous discretion in determining whether an employee’s notice was 
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given as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances.213 This 
discretion is especially problematic in jury decisions.214 Employers argue 
that they need advance notice of leave to make staffing accommodations, 
but juries are frequently unsympathetic to the employers’ needs and instead 
sympathize with the employees who assert that they were sick or had an 
emergency.215 This emotionally guided reasoning directly contradicts the 
revision’s goal of providing employers with advance notice to make staffing 
accommodations.216  
Despite the more clearly defined standards for determining the content 
of an employee’s notice, courts still vary in their interpretation of these 
standards.217 Inconsistent jurisprudence leaves employers and employees 
uncertain as to whether an employee’s stated reasons for leave are 
sufficient to invoke FMLA protection.218 
B. The Regulations Provide Insufficient Information to Determine What 
Constitutes Sufficient Information  
Although the provisions governing the content of notice distinguish 
between emergency and intermittent leave and provide more detail than 
those on timing, there is still uncertainty surrounding the amount and 
quality of information an employee is required to give to invoke FMLA 
leave.219 The content provisions create a spectrum of ambiguity, evidenced 
in Lichenstein and Lanier, in which employers and employees alike are 
unsure whether the information given will place the employee on the side 
of sufficiency, insufficiency, or somewhere in the middle.220 The deciding 
factor in both cases hinged on the same facts—whether claiming a parent 
was in the hospital and that the employee was unable to work was 
sufficient notice—and the courts reached opposite results.221 Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 213. Interview with Jerry Stovall, Jr., Partner, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, 
L.L.P., in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 30, 2015). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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 217. Compare Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburg Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 
(3d Cir. 2012), with Lanier v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 527 F. App’x 312, 317 
(5th Cir. 2013); see supra Part II.B. 
 218. Waterfill, supra note 187. 
 219. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,584 (proposed June 28, 2007) 
(codified at 79 C.F.R. 825 (2016)). 
 220. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302; see also Lanier, 527 F. App’x at 317. 
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317. 
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the dissenting opinion in Lichenstein agreed with Lanier, which 
recognized that it is not just confusion among the circuits as to the 
requirements of the content of notice, but also confusion within the circuits 
themselves.222  
Courts are not alone in finding it difficult to determine what 
constitutes sufficient notice. Employers complain that “[m]uch of the 
frustration they experience in administering FMLA leave stems from the 
difficulty in spotting FMLA-qualifying absences. Employers are not mind 
readers and they often refrain from asking employees why they are absent 
for fear that they may invade an employee’s medical privacy.”223 
Employers further assert that it is unreasonable to expect employers to 
train supervisors on the plethora of health conditions and emergencies that 
might qualify for FMLA leave.224  
Despite these complaints by employers, the regulations do not require 
employees seeking leave for the first time to specifically state in their 
request from work that their leave potentially qualifies for FMLA 
protection.225 However, there are two main justifications for not requiring 
express invocation of FMLA leave.226 First, many employees are unaware 
of the FMLA or unsure if it applies to them.227 If it is a first-time encounter 
with an undiagnosed medical condition, employees may not realize their 
leave could potentially qualify under the FMLA, which makes them 
vulnerable to termination by failing to relay the proper information.228 
Second, in cases of unexpected emergencies, the employee might be too 
preoccupied to contemplate exercising such a degree of precision when 
notifying the employer of leave, as Lichtenstein demonstrated.229  
Although both of these arguments present valid concerns, requiring an 
employee’s notice to include enough information to allow an employer to 
                                                                                                             
 222. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 305 n.16–17. 
 223. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 35,584. 
 224. Id. (“Much of the frustration employers experience in administering 
FMLA leave stems from the difficulty employers have in ‘spotting’ FMLA 
qualifying absences. . . . It is also naïve to think that employers can effectively 
train front line supervisors on the myriad of health conditions and personal family 
emergencies that might qualify for FMLA protection.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 225. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (2016). 
 226. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 35,582. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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determine if the leave is covered by the FMLA is important to the 
employer for purposes of classifying the leave.230 If employers incorrectly 
classify the employee’s leave, the employee can bring a claim against the 
employer for interference.231 Thus, there is a heavy burden on the 
employer at the outset to obtain as much information as possible to ensure 
compliance under the Act.232 However, employers frequently refrain from 
further inquiry when an employee takes medically related leave for several 
reasons.233 One reason employers are skeptical to probe deeper into the 
circumstances surrounding an employee’s medically related leave is that 
employers fear liability for invading the employee’s privacy.234 Another 
reason is that if employees report the need for leave to a supervisor, that 
supervisor may not know the circumstances for which the Act provides 
protection and thus when leave would need to be classified as FMLA leave 
versus those that constitute ordinary sick leave.235 Additionally, the 
employee is in a better position to know if the leave could qualify as 
FMLA leave because only the employee knows the medical history of 
himself or herself and his or her family members.236 For example, if an 
employee reports to a supervisor that he needs the day off because of a 
“headache” and the supervisor mistakenly assumes the request is for 
ordinary sick leave or is unaware that vestibular migraines could qualify 
for FMLA protection, the supervisor would not understand the need to 
“inquire further” to correctly classify the leave as FMLA.237 However, the 
employee is in a better position to make the distinction because the 
employee knows if he has a medical history of vestibular migraines which 
could qualify as FMLA leave, which would require the employer to be 
aware of such to correctly classify it.238 The regulations fail to properly 
account for the fact that classification can be difficult to immediately 
                                                                                                             
 230. 1 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 12:69 (2015). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Nelson, supra note 3, at 622 (“The regulations state that an employer 
should make further inquiries to obtain the details needed to grant leave, 
especially to determine whether such conditions will qualify as ‘serious health 
conditions.’ This is nearly impossible if an employer does not know an employee 
is suffering from such a condition or that the condition has worsened enough to 
qualify her for FMLA leave.”). 
 233. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department 
of Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 35,584. 
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determine in cases where the employee is taking unforeseeable FMLA 
leave for the first time.239  
C. Compliance with Employer Policies for Form of Notice Causes 
Uncertainty Regarding FMLA Compliance  
In many cases, the timing or content of the employee’s notice are both 
adequate, but the employee fails to follow the employer’s policies and 
gives notice in the wrong form. Employers frequently justify terminations 
by citing the employee’s failure to comply with their internal policies.240 
The Preamble to the FMLA regulations notes, “[t]he Department 
recognizes that call-in procedures are . . . critical to an employer’s ability 
to ensure appropriate staffing levels. Such procedures frequently specify 
both when and to whom an employee is required to report an absence. The 
Department believes that employers should be able to enforce non-
discriminatory call-in procedures . . . .”241 As evidenced by the Preamble, 
an employer’s ability to enforce company call-in procedures is important 
to ensure the employee’s notice is given to the proper person to allow the 
business to make necessary adjustments to continue functioning in the 
employee’s absence.  
Since the 2009 revisions, courts are more likely to find an employee’s 
termination justified when the employee fails to call-in at all or blatantly 
ignores the employer’s policy and gives notice to the wrong person, as 
seen in Srouder, because the employer does not have actual knowledge of 
the employee’s notice.242 However, the question of justified termination is 
more difficult to answer in cases like Hudson and Millea.  
                                                                                                             
 239. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.300–301 (2016). Currently, the regulations allow 
an employer five business days from the time of the employee’s initial notice to 
designate the leave as FMLA-qualified or not. If the employer misclassifies the 
leave as non-FMLA and later obtains information from the employee that the 
leave was FMLA-qualified, section 825.301(d) allows for the retroactive 
designation of FMLA leave if the employer and employee mutually agree, but 
only if the misclassification did not harm the employee. If it did cause harm to the 
employee, under subsection (e), the employer may be liable for interference. Thus, 
if employees initially tell employers vague or incorrect information, the employer 
has an incentive to inquire more within five days of the initial notice to avoid 
liability. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 622. 
 240. See Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 241. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 68,006 
(Nov. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825). 
 242. See Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608, 609 (6th Cir. 
2013). 
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In Hudson, the employee did report to the correct person and the 
company did have notice, and the violation was a mere technicality—that 
the notice was delivered via text message rather than a phone call.243 The 
Eighth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could find the proffered reason 
of noncompliance to be pretextual.244 Although the discussion of the text 
message was limited to showing that pretext was more likely if a text 
message had previously been acceptable, the opinion left some concluding 
that the court may refuse to accept such minor deviations from the policy 
as a legitimate reason for termination if the employer is still put on notice 
of the employee’s need for leave.245 
Similarly, Millea appears to be a result-driven decision. The employer 
did have actual knowledge of Millea’s need for leave, but the notice was 
provided in a form prohibited by the employer’s policy—through the lead 
clerk rather than personally reporting to the supervisor.246 To circumvent 
the statutory language that explicitly allows termination for failing to 
provide notice to the specific person the employer’s policy designates, the 
appellate court tried to find a loophole by reasoning that the jury found that 
Millea was “unable” to give notice directly to his supervisor because his 
supervisor triggered the attack.247 Therefore, the court held that he was 
allowed to designate the lead clerk as his spokesperson authorized to give 
notice to his supervisor.248 This finding, however, ignores the plain language 
of the regulation that allows employers to enforce this exact kind of policy 
and expands Congress’s meaning of “unable to do so personally.”249 
Moreover, allowing this circumstance to justify noncompliance opens the 
door for any employee with anxiety, depression, stress disorders, or any 
related disorder to blatantly ignore employer call-in policies and later claim 
that his or her employer was a contributing factor in causing an “episode.” 
The courts’ reasoning in Tyson and dicta in Millea regarding unjustified 
termination when the employer has actual knowledge is flawed under the 
current statutory framework for two reasons. First, the only prohibition 
against having employer policies with stricter requirements than the FMLA 
appears in section 825.302(d). This section is a foreseeable leave provision 
which provides, “FMLA leave may not be delayed or denied where the 
employer’s policy requires notice to be given sooner than set forth in 
                                                                                                             
 243. Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See 1 ANDREW J. RUZICHO ET AL., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL § 
6:13 (2015). 
 246. Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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paragraph (a) of this section and the employee provides timely notice as 
set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.”250 Paragraph (a) of that section 
is specifically entitled “Timing of Notice,” and the provision the court 
relies on speaks only to timing.251 Thus, there is no statutory prohibition 
on requiring the employer’s procedures to be followed—even if the 
designated persons receive actual knowledge of the FMLA leave. Second, 
the provisions governing both foreseeable and unforeseeable leave 
explicitly state that an employee must comply with the employer’s “usual 
and customary notice and procedural requirements,” and that “an 
employer may require employees to call a designated number or a specific 
individual to request leave.”252 Further, the regulations also provide that if 
the employee fails to give notice as required by the Act and the employer 
does not waive the employee’s obligations under its internal leave rules, 
“the employer may take appropriate action under its internal rules and 
procedures for failure to follow its usual and customary notification rules, 
absent unusual circumstances,” as long as the actions are not taken in a 
discriminatory manner.253 
The purpose of the revisions to form of notice was to ensure that 
employers could correctly manage and classify leave.254 If the employee 
is reporting the leave to the wrong person or calling the wrong number, it 
jeopardizes the employer’s receipt of the notice entirely.255 Those same 
concerns are not present when it is apparent that the employer received 
                                                                                                             
 250. Id. Paragraph (a) requires employees to provide the employer “at least 30 
days advance notice before FMLA leave is to begin if the need for leave is 
foreseeable” or “[i]f 30 days is not practicable . . . notice must be given as soon 
as practicable.” Additionally, “[f]or foreseeable leave due to a qualifying 
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actual notice of the employee’s leave request, although the request was not 
provided in the manner required under the employer’s policy.256 However, 
because the current regulations require compliance, absent unusual 
circumstances, and allow employers to take action under their policies for 
noncompliance, the language has been extended to justify terminations in 
cases where the policy behind it does not.257 Furthermore, some courts 
have demonstrated an unwillingness to justify an employee’s termination 
for providing notice in the wrong form when an employer has actual 
knowledge of the notice.258 Therefore, to reach the equitable result, courts 
are making result-driven decisions, ignoring the statutory language and 
attempting to find loopholes by expanding the meaning of the terms 
beyond what Congress intended.259 
IV. REVISIONS TO THE REGULATIONS FOR UNFORESEEABLE LEAVE 
ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE OUTCOMES OF FMLA 
CLAIMS MORE FORESEEABLE 
To strike a better balance between the interests of employers and 
employees, the Federal Regulations should be amended to implement a two-
step notice process for unforeseeable leave that would more efficiently 
balance the needs of employers and employees at each stage of notice. An 
update to the regulations is also necessary to account for advancing 
technology that can help to better achieve the goals of the FMLA in the 
context of notice. A two-step notice procedure that implements modern forms 
of communication would solve many problems related to the timing, content, 
and form of notice in cases of unforeseeable leave. 
Under the first step, employees are required to give notice as soon as they 
are aware of their need for FMLA leave. However, the employees are required 
only to relay that they cannot make their shift. This first step of an employee’s 
notice in cases of unforeseeable leave would serve the purpose of giving 
employers advance notice of the need for leave. Because the primary objective 
of this first step is allowing the employer to make necessary staffing 
arrangements, timely notice is essential while the amount of information and 
the medium in which it is provided are less important. Employees would be 
allowed to take advantage of more cursory forms of notice, such as text 
messaging, that can generally be a more convenient form of communication 
than a telephone call. Thus, despite enforcing a stricter timing requirement, 
the employee is given a safe harbor on issues of content and form. As long as 
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the employee’s initial notice is timely, the employer would not be allowed 
to take any disciplinary action against the employee for violations of the 
employer’s policy.  
Although many argue in cases of unforeseeable leave that employees 
are often not in an emotional state, or potentially even a physical state, to 
give advance notice to employers, this argument is contrary to the intent 
of the Act as it fails to adequately account for employers’ interests.260 
There will always be situations in which an employee is unable to give 
notice. For example, if an employee is unconscious then he or she cannot 
give advance notice. However, absent being unable to give advance notice, 
the employee will be required to notify the employer as soon as the need 
for leave is apparent. 
Under step two, once it becomes practicable for the employee to give 
the employer more information in the manner that the employer’s policy 
specifies, the employee will be expected to provide notice under the 
employer’s call-in policy. The purpose of notice at this step is to allow the 
employer to properly classify the leave, to ensure that the employee and 
employer are complying with their obligations under the Act, and to make 
any arrangements that may be necessary to accommodate both parties 
moving forward. Therefore, the requirements of notice at this stage would 
be more stringent and allow little room for noncompliance with the 
employer’s policies. Although this solution adds an additional burden on 
employees, requiring them to give notice twice rather than once, separating 
notice into two stages will more sensibly align the notice requirements with 
the objectives of notice. Moreover, the burden on employees is mitigated by 
the protection provided by the safe harbor that will prevent termination in 
many cases. 
This two-step procedure helps solve employer and employee concerns 
in several ways. Currently, the employer is left with little recourse when 
an employee with a chronic condition has an attack and fails to inform the 
employer of his absence before the start of the shift, claiming the attack 
prevented him or her from providing advance notice.261 This scenario is 
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especially problematic in highly specialized fields in which replacements 
are difficult to coordinate.262 Emphasizing that the first step is to give the 
employer advance notice to make staffing accommodations while 
simultaneously relaxing the requirements of content and form, the burden 
on the employee to provide notice even when the need for leave is 
unforeseeable is much more manageable. For example, if an employee’s 
mother is rushed to the emergency room, the employee could send a text 
message to inform the employer without having to step away from the 
doctors and her mother to make a lengthy phone call. If the employee were 
required to call the employer and give all of the relevant details at this stage 
so the employer could determine if the leave was FMLA-qualified, it would 
be much more burdensome. If employees are able to inform their employers 
that they will not be able to work their shift sooner, then employers can work 
on making staffing accommodations sooner, which increases the chances of 
being able to cover an employee’s shift.  
Once the condition of the employee’s mother has been stabilized and 
the chaos has lessened, the employee will be expected to provide all of the 
relevant information surrounding the leave in the form of notice that the 
employer’s policies require.263 This way, employers do not have to worry 
                                                                                                             
a replacement . . . . Nonetheless, the current statutory and regulatory provisions 
provide employers with few options.”). 
 262. Id. at 35,552 (noting the industries most impacted are “[employers] whose 
business operations have a highly time-sensitive component, e.g., delivery 
transportation, transit, telecommunications, health care, assembly-line manufacturing, 
and public safety sectors”). 
 263. Stage two of this solution does not implement a definite time limit. Arguably, 
without a definite timing requirement, the same difficulty employees and employers 
currently face in knowing if notice was given “as soon as practicable under the facts 
and circumstances” will still be present. However, setting a time frame within which 
the second stage of notice will be triggered is impracticable when considering 
emergency situations and the variety of circumstances that exist that would constitute 
exceptions to any deadline. One solution to this problem could be to make a distinction 
in the timing requirements between FMLA leave taken in emergency situations and 
recurring, intermittent FMLA leave, such that a definite time limit could be feasible 
for recurring, intermittent FMLA leave but would likely not be for emergency 
situations. However, there are several instances in which leave is both intermittent and 
an emergency, such as epilepsy, that would further complicate timing requirements 
under such a framework. Thus, given the myriad of circumstances that are present in 
the context of unforeseeable leave, the most logical timing requirement of an 
employee’s notice at stage two remains “as soon as practicable under the facts and 
circumstances of each case.” Further, having a strict timing requirement for stage one 
of notice and a more lenient requirement at stage two will likely alleviate many current 
concerns. This is because employers’ complaints that notice was not given as soon as 
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about misclassifying leave because the employee’s original notice was 
deficient, and employees do not have to worry about being denied FMLA 
leave because the notice that they provided in the midst of an emergency 
situation was insufficient.  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose behind the FMLA is to strike a balance between the demands 
of work and family life.264 The Act aims to give employees job security during 
times of medical emergencies without causing undue hardship on employers’ 
business operations.265 Recognizing the fact-sensitive situations that arise in 
the context of FMLA leave, particularly in cases of unforeseeable leave, the 
regulations governing employee notice provide vague and uncertain rules.266 
The imprecise wording of the regulations, specifically regarding the timing, 
content, and form of employee notice, has left employees and employers 
unsure of their obligations under the Act, which in turn leaves employees 
vulnerable to termination and employers vulnerable to lawsuits.267  
To strike a better balance between the interests of employers and 
employees, the FMLA’s notice provisions in the Federal Regulations should 
be amended to include a two-step notice process, which would alleviate 
some of the problems employers and employees face in the application of 
the Act. These revisions would provide employers and employees with more 
predictability and stability and better align the FMLA’s application with its 
intent. 
 
Melissa J. Shaffer 
                                                                                                             
practicable arise mainly because employers are unable to make staffing 
accommodations. Under the two-step notice procedure, employers will likely make 
staffing accommodation after receiving stage-one notice, and thus the timing of stage-
two notice is less of a concern for employers. 
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